Https- Graph.microsoft.com V1.0 Applications Apr 2026

GET /applications?$expand=requiredResourceAccess Then compare with actual API calls. If you expose an API ( api.oauth2PermissionScopes ), the default scope user_impersonation is not automatically added. Many developers forget to define it, then wonder why "Sign in & read user profile" doesn't work. 6. Performance & Throttling Realities This endpoint lives under the /v1.0 workload, which has different throttling than /beta .

Query for apps with unused delegated permissions:

$cert = New-SelfSignedCertificate -Subject "CN=Automation" -CertStoreLocation "Cert:\CurrentUser\My" -KeyExportPolicy Exportable -KeySpec KeyExchange -KeyLength 2048 -KeyAlgorithm RSA -HashAlgorithm SHA256 $base64Cert = [System.Convert]::ToBase64String($cert.RawData) https- graph.microsoft.com v1.0 applications

GET /applications?$filter=signInAudience eq 'AzureADMultipleOrgs'&$expand=owners($top=1),requiredResourceAccess If the response has an empty owners list, any admin in any tenant could theoretically modify the app's consent permissions. That's a red flag for supply chain risk. The /v1.0/applications endpoint looks simple on the surface—just CRUD on app registrations. But its real power comes from understanding the expansion properties, credential types, and the subtle boundary between application and service principal.

If you manage identity in Microsoft 365, you’ve probably spent countless hours in the Azure AD portal clicking through "App registrations." But behind every click is a REST API call. GET /applications

Invoke-RestMethod -Method Post -Uri "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications" -Headers $authHeader -Body $body -ContentType "application/json"

Whether you're automating app lifecycle, building an internal governance tool, or hunting for security misconfigurations, this endpoint is your scalpel. Use it with precision, respect its throttling limits, and always—always—validate the signInAudience before you deploy. That's a red flag for supply chain risk

POST /servicePrincipals

1. Over-privileged app roles via appRoles You can define custom roles in the appRoles array. The danger: any admin can assign users to those roles without extra approval if the app has been consented. Audit appRoles regularly. 2. Leaking identifierUris If your app uses identifierUris (e.g., api://my-app ), that URI becomes a potential token target. An attacker who can register a conflicting URI in another tenant cannot take over your app—but they can cause token validation confusion if your app incorrectly validates the aud claim. 3. requiredResourceAccess creep Apps can request requiredResourceAccess —permissions they need. Over time, developers add scopes but never remove old ones. Attackers can use orphaned, high-privilege permissions if an app's secret is compromised.